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In this paper, we use a differentiated-products set up to assess the impact on competition of a merger 
between Greif and Rheem South Africa. Both parties are active in the industrial packaging products 
sector. The parties’ activities overlap, among others, in the production of large steel drums. Our analysis 
suggests that there is a low degree of substitutability between large steel drums and other products in 
the market. For this reason, we focus our competitive assessment on the unilateral effects of large steel 
drums. 
We rely on a limited amount of relatively high-level data to arrive to robust conclusions on the unilateral 
effects that the merger would induce. We study these unilateral effects using two empirical tools, the 
upwards pricing pressure (UPP) and the gross upwards pricing pressure index (GUPPI). These two 
measures are complementary in assessing the competitive harm that the merger could induce. UPP nets 
out the incentive to raise prices due to lower competition with the incentive to reduce prices due to 
lower marginal costs. GUPPI focuses on the incentive to raise prices post-merger and is linked to the 
market definition that competition authorities use when defining the relevant market. To our knowledge, 
this paper provides the first application in the African continent of such empirical analysis. 
We calculate these two measures following the conclusion of the Tribunal. We conclude that both UPP 








The difficulty to obtain detailed data in developing countries is considered an obstacle for the 
implementation of an effect-based competition policy. In this paper, we show how elsewhere 
widespread empirical analyses can be transposed to the context of data scarcity in a merger. By means 
of a simple differentiated-products oligopoly model, we rely on a limited amount of relatively high-
level data to arrive to robust conclusions on the unilateral effects that a merger would induce.  
To our knowledge, this paper provides the first application in the African continent of such empirical 
analysis. Practitioners (such as competition lawyers and economists) have an interest in monitoring how 
the use of these tools evolves in areas where they have recently been introduced: what analysis was 
proposed, and how it was received in the proceedings. In our case, we show how a simple, yet well-
grounded approach can be useful in situations and countries where data availability, such as it is for 
example the case in certain South African sectors, is limited.  
We base our analyses on the unsuccessful merger between two South African companies. On the 17th 
of March 2017, Greif International Holding B.V. (“Greif” hereafter) and Rheem South Africa (Pty) Ltd. 
(“Rheem”) applied for approval to merge before the Competition Commission of South Africa 
(“Commission”).1,2 The parties are two of the largest providers of industrial packaging solutions in the 
country.  
The Commission was concerned that the merger would give rise to unilateral effects arising from the 
loss in competition. The Commission focused its inquiry on large steel drums, as they accounted for the 
largest proportion of the merging parties’ sales. In this market, the merging parties would enjoy an 
estimated market share of about 90 percent post-merger. According to the Commission, the operation 
constituted a merger to a near monopoly. The Commission also found that barriers to entry were high 
and that customers had limited countervailing power. On the 19th of June 2017, the Commission 
prohibited the merger and issued its reasons. 
The parties disputed the Commission’s market definition. They argued that the relevant market was 
broader than large steel drums and included other forms of packaging, such as large plastic drums and 
reconditioned large steel drums. The parties claimed that the merger would create strong efficiencies, 
likely to be transmitted to the consumer in the form of lower prices.  
On the 3rd of July 2017, the merging parties requested the Competition Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) to 
reconsider the Commission’s decision to prohibit the merger.3 In their brief to the Tribunal, the merging 
parties argued that the Commission had erred in concluding that the merger would result in a substantial 
lessening of competition. The Tribunal of South Africa finally blocked the case on the 31st of January 
2019.4 
In this paper, we estimate empirically the incentives that the consolidated entity would have to raise 
prices post-merger. We model the market using a simple logit model to calculate the diversion ratios 
 
1  The proposed merger between Greif and Rheem had previously been notified and prohibited in 2004 by the Commission. 
The Commission concluded in its 2004 decision, that Greif and Rheem were the only manufacturers of large steel drums 
in South Africa. In addition, the Commission found that there was limited substitutability between large steel drums and 
other products and post-merger the merged entity would be able to unilaterally increase prices. 
2  Note that NERA Economic Consulting has assisted the South African Competition Commission in this case. 
3  Under South African competition law, merging parties can approach the Tribunal to reconsider a merger following a 
decision from the Commission. The Tribunal, an administrative body composed of specialist (lawyers and economists) 
members rather than judges, makes its decisions through an inquisitorial adjudication process. 
4  Greif International Holding B.V and Rheem South Africa (Pty) Ltd vs The Competition Commission of South Africa, 




between the firms. We then calculate the UPP and GUPPI measures using data on prices and quantities 
sold provided by the Commission. 
The rest of the article is organized in the following way. We first provide context on the South African 
market for industrial packaging products and the specific macroeconomic conditions that the country 
experienced during the period of analysis. We then turn to the empirical UPP and GUPPI analysis.  Our 
findings suggest that the merged entity would have an incentive to act unilaterally and raise prices.  
2. The market for industrial packaging products 
Greif and Rheem are both active in the market for industrial packaging products. Industrial packaging 
refers to all forms of packaging that transport a product from their fabrication to the next step in the 
production line, all the way to the final consumer. As such, there are several formats used to store the 
products, the biggest of which is bulk transport by tanker (ships or trucks). With lower quantities, 
companies use intermediate bulk containers, large to small drums and other smaller types of packaging 
(such as pails and cans).  
The activities of the parties overlap in the production of large and small steel drums, steel pails and 
knock-down drums. Knock-down drums are mainly directed to the export market, while small steel 
drums and pails are easily substitutable with plastic containers. The product of competitive interest 
consists, therefore, of large steel drums.5 
Large steel drums have a capacity between 210 and 235 litres and can be of four types: tight-head or 
open-head and lacquered or plain.6 A key aspect of the drums is the thickness of gauge of the steel. The 
main advantages of steel drums are their strength and easy storage, they can stand high temperatures 
while being non-inflammable and they may be the only type of packaging allowed for certain dangerous 
products. Their main drawbacks are their weight and potentially corrosiveness.  
Large steel drums are used in a variety of sectors:7 petrochemicals and lubricants; specialty chemicals; 
paint and paint solvents; and other sectors, such as pharmaceutical or food and beverages. The 
aforementioned characteristics of large steel drums render them the preferred option for petrochemicals. 
Steel drums are also used for solvent-based products, especially in the paints and paint-solvents sector. 
Both the merging parties and the Commission decided to focus their attention on the first three 
application sectors, because they represent the bulk of each merging party’s 2015 volume.  
The nature of products of each industry determines what type of industrial package is more appropriate. 
In these industries, firms can choose between new steel drums and other alternatives, which are: 
- Thick-gauge steel drums, which can be reconditioned up to eight times. Reconditioned drums are 
considerably cheaper than new drums. They are, however, less aesthetically appealing, and despite 
an exhaustive cleaning process, may still contain traces of past products or of the cleaning process 
itself. Hence, they are not viable for products in the human food chain nor are they approved by 
the UN to transport hazardous materials;8 
 
5  Greif International Holding B.V and Rheem South Africa (Pty) Ltd vs The Competition Commission of South Africa, 
Tribunal case no: IM094Jul17, para 2. 
6  Tight-head drums have sealed tops with two bungs to store liquid products. Open-head drums have a removable lid that 
makes them a preferred option for semi-liquids and dry products. 
7  Greif International Holding B.V and Rheem South Africa (Pty) Ltd vs The Competition Commission of South Africa, 
Tribunal case no: IM094Jul17, para 5. 
8  Greif International Holding B.V and Rheem South Africa (Pty) Ltd vs The Competition Commission of South Africa, 




- Plastic drums, which are suitable for water-based products within the paints and paints solvent 
sector. They are not, however, appropriate for corrosive and solvent chemicals or for substances 
that need to be heated to enter the drum, as they can only withstand temperatures up to 65ºC without 
losing their properties. The dimensions of plastic drums are not the same as those of their 
equivalent capacity of large steel drums. Due to this difference in size, the substitutability between 
still and plastic is low. For example, a switch from steel to plastic drums in an industrial setting, 
where the drums’ handling is usually automated with machines, can prove prohibitively costly if 
the machinery needs to be adapted to the differences in sizes.9  
- New or reused intermediate bulk containers: (IBCs) are a large type of industrial container with a 
capacity of five times that of a regular large steel drum. They are used for liquid or granulated 
substances, but they are unsuitable for the storage of hazardous products or small shipments. In 
addition, switching from new steel drums to IBCs involves higher adaptation costs than those of 
switching from steel to plastic drums; and10  
- Other drums, such as fibre drums.  
2.1. Substitutability patterns by application sector  
As previously stated, large steel drums are mainly used in three sections: petrochemicals and lubricants; 
specialty chemicals; and paint and paint solvents. Both the merging parties and the Commission agreed 
that the different applications sectors did not constitute separate relevant markets. The degree of 
substitutability between large steel drums and other packaging solutions, however, is very different 
depending on the application sector. We have gathered in Table 2.1 all the alternatives available in each 
application sector and assessed their degree of substitutability with large steel drums.  
In the petrochemicals sector, for example, internal standards and end-customer requirements render any 
package other than steel drums an unlikely option in most cases. There is, nevertheless, a trend in the 
market that aims to adapt plastic drums to the petrochemicals sector. Therefore, we categorize the 
substitutability between plastic and steel as weak, as we do for the substitutability between new and 
reconditioned drums. To the extent that IBCs have a plastic interior and/or require large quantities to 
be transported, the substitutability with steel drums is almost nil.  
In the specialty chemicals sector, industrial customers could substitute new with reconditioned steel 
drums provided they are not transporting hazardous or delicate elements. We therefore characterize 
their substitutability relation as weak. The different properties of plastic (especially in terms of heating 
or tolerance to chemicals) render plastic drums an unviable option in many cases in this applications 
sector. For this reason, we define the substitutability patterns between them as low or nil.  
Finally, for the paints and solvents sector, as long as the external appeal is not an issue, new and 
reconditioned drums are substitutable for the same paint or paint-solvent. Inside this sector, nevertheless, 
plastic drums are not the preferred option with solvent-based products, which is why we consider their 
substitutability with steel to be weak.  
 
9  Greif International Holding B.V and Rheem South Africa (Pty) Ltd vs The Competition Commission of South Africa, 
Tribunal case no: IM094Jul17, para 68 
10  Greif International Holding B.V and Rheem South Africa (Pty) Ltd vs The Competition Commission of South Africa, 




Table 2.1: Degree of substitutability of large steel drums 
 
Source: Own appraisal.  
 
2.2. Macroeconomic conditions impact intermediate 
products  
Industrial containers are an intermediate good in the production chain. As such, their production tends 
to be correlated with that of the overall industrial performance. If GDP per capita in the country 
decreases, then the industrial packaging sector as a whole should also experience a decrease in volumes. 
For example, Rheem’s 2015 executive committee minutes stated that “the poor drum sales are not a 
reflection of us losing any business but a result of how badly our customers are performing in their 
respective markets”.11  
Indeed, GDP per capita growth rate in South Africa saw a slight decrease in the 2015 – 2018 period.12 
This stagnation had an effect in volumes demanded to the industrial packaging sector, whether it was 
steel or plastic, new or reconditioned drums. 
Figure 2.1 depicts the monthly volumes sold in the country between 2014 and 2016 for a selected 
number of companies in the industrial packaging sector. 13 The volume of large steel drums sold by the 
parties has a decreasing trend. The quantity of large plastic drums and reconditioned drums sold also 
decreased. Out of the four market players we are considering, Rheem exhibits the least decreasing trend. 
There are some instances where the volumes of the industrial packaging solutions fall sharply, like the 
end of 2015 and 2016. These correspond to the summer season in South Africa, where industrial 
production is generally slowed down.  
 
11  Greif International Holding B.V and Rheem South Africa (Pty) Ltd vs The Competition Commission of South Africa, 
Tribunal case no: IM094Jul17, para 163. 
12  We refer to annual GDP per capita growth rate obtained from the World Bank.  
13  We include those firms for which we have monthly data.  
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Figure 2.1: Volumes of industrial packaging solutions decline over the period 
 
Source: Own calculations using data submitted to the Commission.  
The merging parties argued that, given the macroeconomic conditions, the counterfactual to the merger 
may not be one in which both parties continue to complete, but one in which Rheem would inevitably 
exit the market within five to seven years.14 The parties, however, did not provide any further failing-
firm defence.  
The Tribunal considered and rejected the merging parties proposed counterfactual. The Tribunal found 
that financial weakness, while perhaps relevant in some cases, is probably the weakest ground to justify 
a merger, and can certainly not be the primary justification for permitting one. Rheem had, prior to the 
merger, invested significant capital in a new large steel drums production line. This would make 
economic sense for a firm that intended to remain active, competitive and prepared for the future.15 
Furthermore, evidence suggested that global players such as Mauser wanted to enter the South African 
market.16 The Tribunal concluded that the status quo was the likely counterfactual. Furthermore, the 
Tribunal found that Rheem would continue to remain profitable and viable in the market.17 
 
 
14  Greif International Holding B.V and Rheem South Africa (Pty) Ltd vs The Competition Commission of South Africa, 
Tribunal case no: IM094Jul17, para 148. 
15  Greif International Holding B.V and Rheem South Africa (Pty) Ltd vs The Competition Commission of South Africa, 
Tribunal case no: IM094Jul17, para 173. 
16  Greif International Holding B.V and Rheem South Africa (Pty) Ltd vs The Competition Commission of South Africa, 
Tribunal case no: IM094Jul17, para 174. 
17  Greif International Holding B.V and Rheem South Africa (Pty) Ltd vs The Competition Commission of South Africa, 
















3. Quantifying the unilateral effects of the merger 
Following any merger, the consolidated entity can exert a higher market power since it can increase its 
profit by raising the price of one or both merging parties’ products, thus harming consumers. This ability 
to increase profits by raising prices is called unilateral effects. 
In differentiated-products markets, unilateral effects tend to arise particularly when the two merging 
companies have highly substitutable goods. The closer are the substitutes, the larger are the unilateral 
effects. 
The UPP and the GUPPI are two metrics that empirically quantify the incentives of a merged entity to 
implement such potential price change after a merger. 18  They go beyond simple market shares 
comparisons by incorporating demand elasticities and marginal costs. This way, they capture additional 
market dynamics and efficiency gains claimed by the merging parties, which market shares fail to reflect. 
These indices provide an intuitive way to highlight and measure the degree of competition and the level 
of cost savings that would offset the risks of the increase in market power, and help regulators and 
courts make a decision based on a metric that takes all available information into account. 
Often the UPP and the GUPPI are calibrated based on simplifying ad hoc assumptions. For instance, 
they are evaluated only for the two merging firms, irrespective of the presence of other firms or the 
existence of other products. In this paper, we employ a logit specification to model the drum’s South 
African market that allows us to obtain coherent estimates of UPP and GUPPI with respect to the 
relevant market. UPP and GUPPI are, however, only reliable indications of the unilateral effects that 
the merger may induce provided the model they rest on is correct. We will further discuss the reasons 
why we believe a logit model is the right framework in this section.  
This part is devoted to the computation of these indices for the Greif/Rheem proposed merger. We first 
elaborate on the logit model and explain how we estimate the diversion ratios, which constitute the 
building blocks to calculate the unilateral effects of the merger. We do so by modelling the market in a 
differentiated-products setup, which requires a low quantity of data. Secondly, we discuss our empirical 
approach to the definition of the relevant geographic and product market. We finally perform the UPP 
and GUPPI tests and discuss their implications.  
3.1. The logit model and diversion ratios 
The market for large steel drums is a differentiated-products market. Following the discussion on 
section 2.1 on the substitutability of large steel drums, we can conclude that products are horizontally 
differentiated. This basic differentiation renders the logit model the most adequate to approximate the 
functioning of this market.  
The logit model, whose mathematical formulation we briefly recall in the Technical Appendix, rests on 
the assumption that the products are equally independent from one another. The main implication of 
this assumption, which in economic terms is called the independence of irrelevant alternatives, can be 
better grasped using the classical textbook example. Let us consider the market for transportation, in 
which the individual can either take a blue bus, a red bus, or his own car. Following an increase in the 
price of blue bus journeys, the model assumes that the shares of people taking the red bus and people 
taking their private car will increase by the same amount. But this is not a realistic outcome. In reality, 
blue bus users would mainly switch to taking a red bus, which is closer in attributes to their previous 
choice, and the share of people taking their own cars would merely be affected.  
 
18  For the UPP see Farrell J. and Shapiro, C. (2010), ‘Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Merger: An Economic Alternative 
to Market Definition’, The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 10:1 (Policies and Perspectives). For the GUPPI, see 




This assumption has standard implications in our model. Here, we consider that the increase in the price 
of large steel drums will equally impact the market shares of plastic drums, reconditioned drums, and, 
potentially, IBCs. The substitutability patterns in most application sectors are equally weak, 
corroborating the choice of a logit model that assumes that these differentiated products are equally 
substitutable in the eyes of the consumers.  
The first step in our analysis is to calculate the diversion ratio 𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑗 from product i to product j, which 
provides the proportion of sales captured by product j when the price of product i is increased. With the 
logit specification the diversion ratio is obtained directly from the market shares of products i and j, 






The simplicity of the data required to calculate these diversion ratios is what further makes the logit 
model an appropriate framework in this context, where we have limited data on quantities, prices and 
costs.  
Share-based diversion ratios assume that all sales lost by the firm in question are recaptured by other 
firms in the market, and that all firms are equally close substitutes in the eyes of consumers. This 
outcome, a direct consequence of the logit model, is appropriate in this setting because of the 
substitutability patterns discussed in Section 2.1. Furthermore, the merging parties’ strategic documents 
showed that they were close competitors, who monitored and reported on each other’s sales and 
marketing activities.20 The merging parties strategic documents also showed that their customers often 
switched volumes between them.21 
The market shares, and hence diversion ratios, arising from the logit model are closely linked to the 
definition of the relevant market. In a logit model the substitutability patterns are modelled dividing 
products in two groups: the inside market, which includes the products under consideration, and the 
outside market, which is approximated to take into account alternatives to the goods inside the market. 
In our case, the ‘inside’ market is comprised of the main large steel drums companies, while the ‘outside’ 
option contains plastic or reconditioned drums. 
This is a crucial point. Often the UPP and GUPPI are computed on the basis of inside market shares 
only, forgetting the existence of the outside market. In our paper, these metrics are measured on a 
coherent microeconomic basis, as specified by the logit model. This is not an innocuous point since, by 
considering the competitive pressure of the outside market, our evaluation a priori favours the point of 
view of the merging parties. 
We now elaborate on the definition and importance of the relevant market in the next section.  
3.2. The relevant market 
During the proceedings, there was disagreement on the relevant product and geographic market 
definitions.  
With respect to the product market, the parties’ activities interact in the market for large steel drums. 
The Commission considered that the relevant product market consisted of large steel drums as a distinct 
 
19  See the Technical Appendix for the formula derivation. 
20  Greif International Holding B.V and Rheem South Africa (Pty) Ltd vs The Competition Commission of South Africa, 
Tribunal case no: IM094Jul17, para 197. 
21  Greif International Holding B.V and Rheem South Africa (Pty) Ltd vs The Competition Commission of South Africa, 




product market.22 The parties, however, stated that, to the degree that the substitution patterns differ by 
application sector, the relevant market included all large industrial packaging solutions: steel, plastic 
and reconditioned drums, as well as IBCs.23 The Tribunal found the relevant product market to be the 
market for the manufacture and supply of large steel drums only.24  
With respect to the geographical market definition, the Commission considered that the relevant product 
market was constituted on a provincial level, while the parties argued for a national market.25 Prior to 
the proceedings both parties’ experts met and agreed that the determination of the geographic market 
would not materially impact the outcome of the analysis. The Tribunal hence chose not to conclude on 
the geographic market.26  
Since data are mainly available at a national level, we take a lenient approach that favours the parties 
and calculate the unilateral effects nationwide.27 This means that, from a geographical perspective, our 
estimates constitute a lower bound for the incentives to raise prices. If the incentives to raise prices in 
the national market are high, we can expect the unilateral effects of the merger in each province to be 
at least as high, if not higher. This follows since the number of competitors is lower at the regional level 
than at the national level, and the two merging parties are present in the most important regions.  
We transpose these decisions into our logit model. As stated in the previous section, we consider that 
the inside market is comprised of the main large steel drums companies (relevant market), while the 
‘outside’ option contains less likely substitutes such as plastic or reconditioned drums. The 
approximation of the ‘outside’ market is one of the main issues when one considers a microeconomic 
model covering the whole market, as in the case of the logit model chosen here. Given the discussion 
above, we stick to the final decision of the Tribunal and consider that the outside option includes plastic 
and reconditioned drums.  
In a preliminary exercise, we considered three additional market definitions as a robustness check, 
where we varied the products included in the ‘outside’ market: plastic, reconditioned and small steel 
manufacturers; 28  only large steel drums; and Greif and Rheem as a pure duopoly with no close 
substitutes. These different definitions of the outside good would change the overall market size and 
thus the shares that we allocate to Greif and Rheem, and could possibly impact the results. We find, 
however, that they all lead to the same conclusion: the merger is likely to induce unilateral effects. We 
hence decide to only show the analysis using the market definition that most aligns with that of the 
Tribunal’s decision.29  
 
22  Greif International Holding B.V and Rheem South Africa (Pty) Ltd vs The Competition Commission of South Africa, 
Tribunal case no: IM094Jul17, para 5 and 6 
23  Greif International Holding B.V and Rheem South Africa (Pty) Ltd vs The Competition Commission of South Africa, 
Tribunal case no: IM094Jul17, para 75. 
24  Greif International Holding B.V and Rheem South Africa (Pty) Ltd vs The Competition Commission of South Africa, 
Tribunal case no: IM094Jul17, para 66. 
25  The Commission gathered enough evidence, however, to argue that the relevant market was at a provincial level, with 
customers in Durban and Gauteng, where production of both companies is located, being the most likely to experience 
changes after the merger. 
26  Greif International Holding B.V and Rheem South Africa (Pty) Ltd vs The Competition Commission of South Africa, 
Tribunal case no: IM094Jul17, para 140. 
27  Anchor provided the Commission data on their Durban based operations.  
28  In 2016, two new entrants accessed the market: Infinity drums and Polydrum. Infinity and Polydrum together have below 
2 % of total market share in 2016, which signals that entrants in this market face high barriers to entry. If we consider that 
the relevant market includes exclusively large steel drums, the merger would be de facto a merger to monopoly. 




In this article, thus, the overall market comprises all industrial packaging products. We use monthly 
data over the period 2014-2016 included.  
The relevant margins for computing price pressure indices are those that only take into account variable 
costs, without considering fixed costs. Variable costs obtained from the accounting system of firms are 
a natural and adequate measure of marginal costs. We received this information from the Commission, 
for the relevant period of analysis for Rheem and Greif.30,31 
3.3. Upward pricing pressure (UPP) 
The UPP is a net figure signalling whether the merging firm has an incentive to raise prices post-merger, 
originally proposed by Farrell and Shapiro (2010).32 It does not give an indication as to how much the 
prices will increase, but rather if they are likely to increase after the merger.  
The advantage of the UPP measure is that it takes into account the two forces that the merger induces: 
the increase in prices and the efficiency gains. It looks at the incentive firm i has to increase prices if it 
knows that a certain proportion of its lost sales will switch to firm j, and considers that there may be 
cost efficiencies passed on to consumers.  
The formula for the UPP is: 
 ( )i ij j j iUPP DR p c eff c=  − −   (2) 
where 
ijDR  is the diversion ratio of firm i to firm j, p are prices and c are the costs of the parties. The 
eff parameter is the percentage decrease in costs induced by the merger, and we assume it to be between 
0 and 10 percent.33  
If the UPP is positive, then the incentives to raise the prices following the merger are not countervailed 
by the lower costs. On the other hand, if the UPP is negative, the merger induces enough cost 
efficiencies that the price the consumer will pay is unlikely to increase.  
 
30  In Greif’s case, we estimated the margins from December 2015 onwards. We did so by taking the average of the margins 
of that month in the previous years. 
31 In the so-called “simulation model” in the quantitative analysis of mergers, marginal costs are estimated from the first-order 
conditions associated with the profit maximization under Bertrand competition (if this is the correct conduct), after having 
estimated a logit demand. We did not implement this method here precisely because our objective is to propose a simpler and 
direct procedure to measure the UPP and GUPPI metrics, that is to say, without estimating a demand model but based on 
coherent assumptions (e.g., logit preferences as here). We then need to use the marginal costs provided by the parties to 
compute the UPP and GUPPI metrics as in the sequel. One could doubt that they are the true marginal costs. However, using 
the marginal costs provided by the parties is conservative in the sense that it is favourable to them. Moreover, given that we 
compute the UPP and GUPPI metrics for different values of the efficiency parameter, that the firms could have lied on the true 
values of marginal costs has practically no impact on the evaluation of the merger.  
32  Farrell J., and Shapiro, C. 2010. “Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market 
Definition”, The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 10(1)). 
33  In a submission to the South African Competition Commission, the parties claimed that the efficiencies induced by the 




3.4. Gross upward pricing pressure index (GUPPI) 
The main drawback of the UPP is that it only signals that the parties have an incentive to raise prices, 
but it does not state by how much. To make this kind of analysis, Salop and Moresi (2009) proposed 
the GUPPI.34  
The GUPPI is a price index that relates the UPP with the market dynamics. It expresses the price change 
as a percentage of pre-merger prices by connecting the lost sales of one firm to the increase in revenues 
of the other. It does not, however, take into account the merger synergies nor the competitors’ response 
to the merger.  









=    (3) 
The GUPPI has a straight-forward connection to the market definition and the small but significant non-
transitory increase in price (SSNIP) test. The products of two parties are assumed to belong to a distinct 
relevant market if they find it profitable to impose a SSNIP of around 5 percent. In such a case, the 
merger would be considered a merger to monopoly. Assuming linear demand and equal constant 
marginal costs, there is a well-known link between the SSNIP and the GUPPI: Two products are 
assumed to belong to a distinct relevant market if the GUPPI is greater than two times the SSNIP. This 
means that a GUPPI of less than 5 percent would not raise concerns. A GUPPI above 10 percent, on the 
other hand, is de-facto eliminating all effective competition. If the GUPPI is between 5 percent and 10 
percent, the merger needs further screening and the use of complementary metrics, like the UPP measure, 
is advised.  
3.5. Results of the competitive assessment  
We assume that the relevant market incorporates large steel drums, plastic drums and reconditioned 
drums. We received monthly data available from 2014 to 2016 from the Commission. As to the 
competitors, we have monthly data for Megapack (plastic drums) and Anchor (reconditioned drums).  
Table 3.1 below shows summary statistics of prices and quantities for the market. Greif is a clear leader, 
followed closely by Rheem. In total, these two firms control almost 80 percent of the total market. The 
data for Anchor starts in 2015 and it shows a constant market share for the period of analysis. Although 
Megapack’s market share trend is decreasing, it increases slightly in the last months. 
 




Table 3.1: Summary statistics of market shares and prices 
 
Source: Own calculations using data submitted to the Commission.  
 
We have simulated the UPP with different values of the efficiency parameter. A summary of the results 
is displayed in Table 3.2. For each value of the efficiency parameter (eff), we report the average and 
standard deviation of the resulting monthly UPP. 
Table 3.2: UPP summary statistics  
 
Source: Own calculations using data submitted to the Commission. 
 
The average UPP is always positive, except if marginal costs decrease by more than 10 percent. A 
positive UPP means that the resulting entity would have an incentive to raise prices. Only considering 
efficiencies above 10 percent would the average efficiency gains be enough to countervail the unilateral 
effects. The parties communicated to the Commission that they expected the efficiencies to be below 
this threshold.  
We therefore conclude that, even under the parties’ opinion that the market is national, there is a 
significant risk that the consolidated entity would set higher prices than the pre-merger ones. The level 
of efficiencies claimed by Rheem and Greif for the merger is not sufficient to counterbalance these 
potential unilateral effects.  
We then turn to the GUPPI calculations. Table 3.3 displays the summary statistics for Rheem’s and 
Greif’s GUPPI. The average GUPPI for the parties is slightly higher than 8 percent. In Greif’s case, it 
is not statistically different from 10 percent. 
Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum
Greif 37.19% 52.54% 274.74 R 327.55 R
Rheem 27.99% 39.57% 249.75 R 312.86 R
Megapack 11.95% 33.62% / /
Anchor 0.00% 10.96% / /
Market Share Prices
0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10%
Mean 25.63 20.48 15.34 10.19 5.05 -0.10
Std. dev. 15.25 15.34 15.44 15.54 15.65 15.77
Mean 22.61 18.00 13.39 8.79 4.18 -0.43







Table 3.3: GUPPI summary statistics  
 
Source: Own calculations using data submitted to the Commission. 
Note: The negative values of GUPPI correspond to months when the data displays outlier negative margins. 
 
Most importantly, on average the parties would have strong incentives to raise prices post-merger. In 
many months, the GUPPI is well above 10 percent, signalling that the consolidated firm would find it 
profitable to impose a SSNIP of 5 percent.  
This finding corroborates the Commission’s view that large steel drums can be considered a relevant 
market by themselves. In this case, the transaction is effectively a merger to monopoly.  
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have looked at the unilateral effects of a merger in the South African industrial 
packaging sector. Using a simple differentiated-products oligopoly model, we retrieve the diversion 
ratios from lost sales following an increase in prices. These diversion ratios allow us to gauge the 
incentives to raise prices that the merged firm would face. The incentives to raise prices are assessed 
using the UPP and GUPPI, two common indices in antitrust investigations. The advantage of our 
approach is that, based on a coherent microeconomic model, it provides robust conclusions while 
relying on a limited amount of relatively high-level data.  
We show that the prices post-merger for Rheem’s and Greif’s products would be significantly higher 
than pre-merger. This finding is robust to different definitions of the market. Although no one type of 
evidence is dispositive, the analysis remains a useful screening tool to illustrate that the merging parties 
would increase prices post-merger.35  
The key lesson from the court case is that empirical analysis, viewed in conjunction with the merging 
parties’ internal documents, and the factual testimony of witnesses, demonstrate that unilateral effects 
would arise as result of the proposed merger. To our knowledge, this paper provides the first application 
in the African continent of such empirical tools. 
The Tribunal noted the extensive evidence from various strategic documents and customer testimony, 
which showed that the merging parties were close competitors.36 A merger that eliminated head-to-head 
competition between close competitors was likely to result in a substantial lessening of competition. 
The merging parties conceded that barriers to entry in the large steel drums market were high, with the 
main barrier to entry being the significant capital outlay required to manufacture large steel drums.37 
The merging parties also conceded that customers did not have countervailing buyer power to mitigate 
 
35  Greif International Holding B.V and Rheem South Africa (Pty) Ltd vs The Competition Commission of South Africa, 
Tribunal case no: IM094Jul17, para 114. 
36  Greif International Holding B.V and Rheem South Africa (Pty) Ltd vs The Competition Commission of South Africa, 
Tribunal case no: IM094Jul17, para 197. 
37  Greif International Holding B.V and Rheem South Africa (Pty) Ltd vs The Competition Commission of South Africa, 
Tribunal case no: IM094Jul17, para 204. 
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Greif 8.78% 0.05 -3.94% 22.45%




any competitive harm arising from the proposed merger.38 The Tribunal also examined and dismissed 
the merging parties arguments regarding efficiencies and found them to be speculative and not 
verifiable.39 
We therefore conclude that, if the merger had been approved, prices would likely have increased, which 
would have ultimately hurt consumers.  
The Tribunal ultimately prohibited the merger in January 2019.  
  
 
38  Greif International Holding B.V and Rheem South Africa (Pty) Ltd vs The Competition Commission of South Africa, 
Tribunal case no: IM094Jul17, para 217. 
39  The efficiencies claimed were not proved to be likely or timely. Further, the efficiencies were not likely to benefit 
consumers. Greif International Holding B.V and Rheem South Africa (Pty) Ltd vs The Competition Commission of South 





The market for large steel drums is a differentiated-products market. To model it, let us assume there is 
a representative consumer k on the market, and his preferences are approximated by a logit-type 
model.40 His utility to acquire a unit of good i is given by: 
𝑢𝑘𝑖 = 𝛼𝑝𝑖 + 𝑥𝑖𝛽 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝑘𝑖, 
where 𝑝𝑖  is product i’s price, 𝑥𝑖 is a set of product i’s observed characteristics, 𝛿𝑖 is a random term 
which represents the product i’s unobserved characteristics and 𝑘𝑖 is a random term to account for 
measurement and optimisation errors. 
The market share is a measure of the probability that this consumer k will chose to buy from a certain 







The diversion ratio from i to j provides the proportion of sales captured by product j when the price of 


















−𝛼𝑠𝑖(1 − 𝑠𝑖)  ∀𝑖 = 𝑗
𝛼𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑗  ∀𝑖 ≠ 𝑗
. 








40  See for instance, Ben-Akiva, M., and Lerman, S.R., (1985), Discrete Choice Analysis: Theory and Application to Travel 
Demand, The MIT Press. 
